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Research originally developed in the 1970s to make television and mass media
advertising more effective has involved into a contemporary system of
propaganda manipulation.  Agents use social media to convince people that
fake news is a valid reason for people to act and to vote.  While the Russian
manipulation of the U.S. presidential election in 2016 has received the most
attention, people are being manipulated around the world. These manipulations
undermine democratic governments, which require an informed, voting public.
This paper outlines the theories behind the manipulation of social media and
the conditions under which these efforts are most likely to work.
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Fake news is a direct threat to the 96 democratic national governments in the world because
propaganda can be put on steroids when big data is combined with social media use.  The
threat comes from private and governmental forces that seek to manipulate election results
and select leaders by persuading people into voting in a directed way without the voters
understanding how they are being manipulated.
Propaganda has been around since people tried to persuade Greeks and Romans
to vote for someone or support a cause in the forum.  In World War I propaganda became
an instrument of governmental policy (Lasswell, 1927, 1971).  The British government told
stories to the Americans of German soldiers eating babies when “the Huns” invaded Belgium.
In World War II, the U.S. Government printed posters showing Japanese leaders as diabolical
fiends.  Hitler manipulated the Germans into their support for his leadership through
propaganda.  In the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the countries of NATO threw charges
against each other for two generations (Atkinson, 2011; Casey, 2010; Costigliola, 2000;
Parry-Giles, 2002, 1994).  All of these propaganda efforts were delivered to a mass audience
and so the effectiveness of the propaganda, as with any mass communication, was short-
lived, might be viewed by only a small portion of the population, and viewed with scepticism
by those people who did see it.  Only in North Korea where the government controls all
media outlets, all public discourse, and educates children have propaganda efforts to
persuade a mass number of people been effective (Demick, 2012).
Mass Media
The real potential of mass media was revealed on November 15, 1926, when a signal from
NBC Radio Network in New York City reached 22 stations as far west as Kansas City (Hilmes,
2007).  Soon a single broadcaster at a station anywhere in the U.S. could reach everyone in
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the United States with news, entertainment, and programming.  National marketing became
possible because advertisers could reach the whole nation at one time.  However, that was
also the problem.  Everyone, everywhere.  A cereal company paid to reach consumers who
hated cereal as well as those that bought corn flakes every week.
Consumer behavior, marketing, and advertising paid for research to find out what
worked since paying to reach a mass audience when only two or three people out of a 100/
1000/10000/100000 were potentially going to buy an advertiser’s product was a waste of
money.  Effective marketing particularly became an issue as the mass television market of
the 1960s evolved into cable television programming.  In the 1960s, Bonanza attracted
about 60% of the American public watching television on a Sunday night.  The final episode
of Game of Thrones in spring 2019 attracted 19.3 million viewers (Elliott, 2019) out of a
potential audience of 119.9 million homes totalling 305.4 million people, e.g. 6 percent of
the potential audience watched the Thrones final episode (Nielsen, 2019).
Wells and Tigert (1971) offered advertisers insight into the buying public based
on a profile of the consumers’ Attitudes, Interests, and Opinions (AIOs).  Arnold Mitchell
(1983) divided consumers by their Values, Attitudes, and Lifestyle (VALs).  From a
communication perspective, these two theories of market segmentation divided the mass
audience into groupings of people who shared similar meanings and ideology.  Therefore,
people in the group were likely to be interested in similar products and making purchases
like other people in the group.  Put simply, marketing golf clubs, golf shirts, and a new
Cadillac to members of the local country club would appeal to their VALs and AIOs.  However,
these two theories still had limitations because no mass medium reached all members of
country clubs, much less just the members looking to buy a new car.  Golf Channel and
maybe coverage of The Masters’ golf tournament were better options than a western genre
television show, but cable television could not deliver a narrowly targeted audience.
Internet marketing took psychographics into more promising targeted directions.
The formation of meaning communities allows Netflix to build your movie preferences or
Amazon to offer you products when you log in.  Grocery chains now track your purchases
with your loyalty card.  If data shows you generally fit into a group with 150 similar people
and 25 of them have started buying craft beer, the Kroger chain should offer a coupon for
craft beer to all 150 people in that market segment.
In 2016, the Russians took their propaganda efforts and targeted them through
market segmentation to very narrow audiences.  The big data collected by Facebook about
its users provided a way for the Russians to reach millions of people in the small meaning
communities to which the Facebook users had self-selected membership.  Plus, the Russians
ran their market research data collection, i.e., the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which
used its Facebook data collection to obtain information on millions of users (see Schwadron,
2018; Korecki, 2019; Romm, 2019; Kranish, 2019).  Then the Russians sent out thousands
of messages each targeted to a small group of people.  The result was that thousands of
people were motivated to vote based on who they hated, what they liked, and the ideology
they believed in.  The effort was not to convince people to choose Trump over Clinton and vote
accordingly.  The effort told people that they had a personal stake in the outcome of the
election and that they should go vote based on who they hated and who shared their ideology.
What makes this market segmentation marriage to social media so dangerous to
democracies is that the message creators do not have to tell the truth and they do not have
to spend a lot of money on their efforts.  They do not even have to be a government.  You, me,
and a laptop computer could destroy a candidate or attract voters to a candidate over
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For example.  Abraham Lincoln is running for senator from Illinois. We do not like his
position on racial equality.  We post on Twitter groups that Lincoln supports federal
legislation requiring first-degree murder charges be filed every time a police officer shoots
a person of Chicano or African-American ethnicity.  Then we form a Facebook group called
Justice for Police Officers in America, and then we invite members of similar Facebook
groups to join ours.  Our cost is $0.00, and Lincoln’s campaign has to spend money to
refute our lies. What is happening to our elections is dangerous stuff.  This paper will give
some broad perspective on the problem.  Then will come an explanation of how market
segmentation works and then what happens when market segmentation is put on the steroids
of big data and social media.
The Fakes
The 2016 presidential election in the United States has received probably the most attention
of all the efforts to spread fake information through propaganda.  A report written by the
U.S. Justice Department Special Counsel Robert Mueller concluded that “The Russian
government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in a sweeping and systematic way”
(Mueller, III, 2019).  Later, the Dossier Center, an anti-Putin organization in London, indicated
that the Russian efforts were bigger than just the election.  The Russian plan was to radicalize
African-Americans to create racial tensions in several southern states in the U.S.  In the
words of NBC reporters, “The plans show that Prigozhin’s circle has sought to exploit racial
tensions well beyond Russia’s social media and misinformation efforts tied to the 2016
election” (Engel, Benyon-Tinker, & Werner, 2019). Yevgeny Prigozhin ran the IRA (Myre,
2019).  According to testimony before U.S. Senate subcommittees by Heather A. Conley of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Russians have a plan called the New
Generation Warfare.  “Therefore, the true challenge lies in understanding the persistent
and penetrating nature of the Kremlin’s efforts to render a democracy so helpless that it
cannot defend its sovereignty or national interests,” Conley (2019) told Congress.
China also is seeking to influence American politics, according to a report issued
by the Hoover Institute (Diamond & Schell, 2018).  China’s “coercive and covert activities”
are a direct threat to “democratic values and freedoms” of the United States, states the
report.  The Chinese are motivated to attack American freedoms, according to the report,
because those freedoms are a threat by example to one-party rule in China.  The Chinese
government seeks to spread its influence in the technology sector, the Chinese American
community, Chinese language media outlets, business, think tanks, university campuses,
and through political interactions with civic groups and politicians.  The report notes that
Chinese efforts also are occurring in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the New
Zealand, Singapore, and the UK.
A minority report written by the U.S. Senate subcommittee on foreign affairs (2018)
outlines Russian interference in several elections.  In Ukraine in 2004 Prime Minister Putin
of Russia appeared at a political rally.  StopFake.org tracks Russian disinformation campaigns
in Ukraine.  Stop Fake has stories of Russians claiming homes will be demolished without
notifying tenants, to reports that the United States is critical of NATO activities in the Black
Sea.  The subcommittee report describes the creation by Russians of patriotic groups in the
country of Georgia to undermine the elected government in Georgia.  Similarly, in Montenegro
the Russians funded The Democratic Front in an attempt to keep Montenegro out of NATO,
as explained in the subcommittee report.  Kalinina, Yusupova, and Voevoka (2019) found
evidence that the Russian government uses state media to spread disinformation.
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“News articles from Russia Today contain a large number of examples of applied speech
means of manipulation,” they state as they explain their statistics.  “Among the analyzed 48
news articles, only seven are without any of the ...manipulative ways of influence on
readers” (p. 313).
The U.S. 2018 midterm elections also were targeted by propaganda campaigns.
Iran, Russia, and Venezuela used Twitter accounts to send messages out thousands of
times (Romm, 2019). Efforts were also made on Facebook and Twitter to discourage people
from voting (Romm, 2018).  One tweet reported that immigration officers would be stationed
at polling locations.
Candidates for the 2020 American presidential election already are being targeted
by negative propaganda, according to reporting by Politico (Korecki, 2019).  Among those
attacked early in the race have been Elizabeth Warren, Kamala Harris, and Beta O’Rourke.
“It looks like the 2020 presidential primary is going to be the next battleground to divide
and confuse Americans,” said Brett Horvath.  Horvath is quoted in the Politico story; he is
associated with Guardians.ai, a group that seeks to counter disinformation campaigns.
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in 2019 created ads for Facebook featuring
A.J. from Texas, Thomas from Washington, and Tracey from Florida (Novak, 2019).  Only the
images were purchased from iStock.com, and the models were Europeans (Condon, 2019).
In India, five visitors to a village were attacked—one killed—after a WhatsApp
post indicated the men were kidnapping children.  In little more than four months, 17
people were beaten in India when other fake posts were generated on WhatsApp (BBC
News, 2018).
Facebook has found itself on the front lines of the propaganda wars.  On January
17, 2019, Facebook removed 300 sites that originated in Russia, according to a Facebook
release (Gleicher, 17 January 2019). Owned by a Russian news agency, the accounts on
Facebook and Instagram had about 790,000 users in Eastern Europe and Asia.  The accounts
spread disinformation about NATO (Romm, 2019).  On March 26, 2019 Facebook removed
more than 2600 pages tied to Iran, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Russia for sending out spam
and inauthentic behavior—forbidden under Facebook rules (Reuters, 26 March 2019). On
May 6, 2019, Facebook took down Russian accounts attacking Ukraine (Vavra, 2019).
Facebook director of cyber policy, Nathaniel Gleicher (6 May, 2019), explained: “The
individuals behind this campaign — which was also active on other internet platforms —
engaged in a number of deceptive tactics, including the use of fake accounts to join Groups,
impersonate other users and to amplify allegations about a public figure working on
behalf of intelligence services. They also posted content about local politics including
topics like immigration, religious issues and NATO.”  Iran held 51 fake accounts on Facebook,
which were used to “impersonate” 2018 Republican candidates for Congress (Starks, 2019).
Facebook also removed accounts by individuals for spreading hate speech.  Those
banned from Facebook included Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam, Alex Jones of
InfoWars, Paul Nehlen who advocates white racism, and conspiracy advocates Milo
Yiannopoulos and Laura Loomer (Dwoskin & Timberg, 2019).
Then there are the social media events driven by private groups.  The public voting
for a television talent show was rigged when bots were used to increase the support for a
10-year-old singer (Wise, 2019).  Parents of autistic children are subscribing to cures on
Facebook like bathing the autistic children in bleach and anti-vaccine conspiracy theories
thrive on the internet (Zadrozny, 21 May 2019).  LinkedIn has been targeted by groups
creating fake profiles (Satter, 2019).  A fake warning of a nuclear attack was issued in
Hawaii in 2018; a 2019 study indicates creating fake alerts is easy (Bode, 2019).
Goodman & Goodman
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Harwell (2019) reports on the ease of faking videos.  The Fact Checker at The Washington
Post (2019) note that videos can be manipulated in several ways: misrepresentation about
the video, videos cut to show content out of context, videos edited to leave out context
through omission, splitting together two different videos, doctoring video, using a computer
to generate video.  Only days after Democratic candidates presented plans to end private
health insurance in the U.S., a right-wing organization, One Nation, began running deceptive
advertising (Sullivan, 2019).
A poll by the Pew Research Center found that more than half of social media users
in Tunisia, Lebanon, Vietnam, Jordan, South Africa, Philippines, Venezuela, Kenya, Colombia,
India, and Mexico were targeted for false information (Silver, 2019).  According to the
European Union (2019), the Russians interfered in elections in Ukraine (2014), a referendum
in The Netherlands (2016), the Brexit vote (2016), Catalan independence vote (2017), German
elections (2017), French elections (2017), and Italian elections (2018).  The Australian
Strategic Policy Institute also identified interference in Australia, Brazil, Colombia, the
Czech Republic, Finland, Indonesia, Israel, Malta, Norway, Singapore, and Taiwan
(Ramasundara, 2019).   The 2019 EU elections were targets of bots and fake accounts
(Starks, Cerulus, & Scott, 2019).  A report written by Symnatec says that the efforts of
disinformation were even more sophisticated during the 2019 EU elections for parliament.
“Experts following the vote have pointed out that the EU election campaign showed that the
sophistication of social media influence networks is increasing, with an increased emphasis
on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often
divisive political content,” conclude Starks, Cerulus, and Scott (2019).
This is not a comprehensive list of all elections with meddling; the U.S. government
has a history of interference in foreign elections (see Robinson, 1992; Levin, 2016; Shane,
2018).  However, the problem is worldwide and can occur whenever people vote, whether
officially in state elections or just as part of a collective effort to elect a beauty queen.
Presidential Politics 2016
Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2018) explains the possible ramifications on democracies in her
analysis of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election.  She notes that 78,000 votes in
three states decided the election (p. 66).  Jamieson explained the extent of Russian influence
efforts:
(i) Russians posted 1.4 million election tweets that reached 288 million users of Twitter;
(ii) The Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) placed 3000 ads on Facebook and
Instagram, which were seen by 11.4 million people;
(iii) The Russians placed 1000 videos on YouTube;
(iv) Russian bots forwarded Donald Trump tweets 470,000 times;
(v) Eight Russian Facebook accounts hosted eight election events, which were liked 2
million times;
(vi) The IRA hosted 129 events, which were seen by 25,800 Facebook accounts;
(vii) Russian trolls posted 29 million times on Facebook, and they were diffused to 126
million users.
“To harass the fears and enthusiasms of US citizens to their cause, Russians
discourse saboteurs crafted and placed ads on US platforms, organized rallies that would
showcase cultural divisions, created imposter sites, and strategically messaged to millions
on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, and Reddit, among others,” explains
Jamieson (p. 6).
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Malcolm Nance (2016) believes the 2016 efforts were part of a larger Russian
propaganda effort.  He explains “...Russia Today (RT) television is engaged in a strategic
propaganda campaign to further Russia’s political goals and has been used to co-opt the
extreme wings of the American political parties including tacit and open support for neo-
Nazis, anti-government extremist libertarians, conspiracy theorists, and the marginalized
left such as the Green Party” (p. xvii), a Louisiana chemical plant explosion, an Ebola
outbreak in U.S., and Atlanta police shooting an unarmed black woman (p. 108).  Russian
“trolls” are expected to comment on news stories 50 times a day, tweet 50 times a day from
different Twitter accounts, and place posts six times a day on various Facebook accounts
(p. 109).   To Nance, the Russian efforts are directed by President Vladimir Putin to weaken
NATO, weaken democracies, and damage the U.S. economy.  The efforts to help Trump would
give Putin’s efforts a big advantage, explains Nance.  “If Trump’s acolytes did have real ties
to Russia’s center of power and if they were successful in electing Trump, they would be in
a position to handle a potential president’s most intimate secrets,” wrote Nance (p. 58).
“They would also be able to advance Russia’s objectives, desires, and activities—fully
in-line with their fortunes—above America’s interests, with the full force of the Oval Office.”
Psychographics
The key to the success of the Russian efforts in 2016, explains Jamieson, was to strategically
message “millions on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, and Reddit, among
others” (p. 6).  Psychographics provides the means to strategically message a group of
people with a targeted message.
Abraham Maslow’s work (1954) was the precursor to psychographics. Maslow argues
that human behavior is motivated by need fulfilment and that the needs are in a hierarchy
whereby the lowest needs have to be fulfilled first before the person goes on to the next level
need.  The needs are physiological (sex, hunger, thirst), safety and security (including health),
love and belonging, self-esteem, and self-actualization (a state of creativity and analytical
thinking).  In terms of advertising, the goal is to tell the customers what need the product fulfils.
Advertisers use need fulfilment to target audiences based on their unmet needs and how the
consumers would fulfil that need by purchasing the product.  Teens may be focused on
physiological needs, and so sexual appeals would be a strong motivator; seniors may be
worried more about health problems and are targets for prescription drugs.
The ELM Model
Petty and Cacioppo (1981) developed the Elaboration Likelihood (ELM) Model of persuasion.
This theory identifies variables that play a role in whether a particular person will respond
to a persuasive message.  Their central route to persuasion is built on the premise that
people hold strong opinions on some matters, which are issues they have studied and that
have a high level of personal relevance.  Accordingly, following the central route makes it
easy to persuade a person to accept a message if that message agrees with the person’s
current stand on an issue of high importance and is an issue of high ego involvement.
Conversely, it is very difficult to use the central route to change a person’s mind by offering
a position that contradicts the person’s existing opinions.  It is easy to use the central
route to reinforce a person’s existing opinions and difficult to convince them to change a
highly regarded position.  A person who has carefully studied candidates for president
and plans to vote for a candidate will agree with messages that tell them they have made
a wise choice.  A person will reject a message that the choice is a bad one.
Goodman & Goodman
10
Media Watch 11 (1)
Petty and Cacioppo (1981)  say that attitude change can be achieved easily through
the peripheral route.  The peripheral route involves issues that a person has little interest
in, have little knowledge of, and ego involvement is low.  Grocery shopping involves many
peripheral routes.  People shop for bananas, soups, and cereals without necessarily caring
much what they bring home.  Product placement, coupons, or sale prices may convince
them one week to buy one product and a different one the next.  It is easy to persuade
people through the peripheral route.  In terms of politics, people may use the central route
in picking a president but may use the peripheral route in selecting who to elect as the state
insurance commissioner.
To figure out whether to use the central or peripheral route, Petty and Cacioppo
(1981) recommend doing attitude research.  They describe attitudes as “convenient
summaries of our beliefs” (p. 8).  The more extreme the attitude and the more polarized the
position, the more the attitude is predictive of behavior.  “Knowing our attitudes presumably
helps others predict the kinds of behaviors we are likely to engage in more accurately than
almost anything else we can tell them,” they explain (p. 8).  Once an attitude is in the central
route, people will generally respond to a new message without spending a lot of time
processing the new message; they either accept it or reject quickly.  Petty and Cacioppo
conclude that it is easier to appeal to an existing attitude than it is to create a new attitude.
“The elaboration-likelihood model indicates that it is quite difficult to produce an enduring
attitude change by exposing people to persuasive communication,” they write (p. 266).
“The recipient of the message must have both the motivation and the ability to process the
information contained in the communication, and the information presented must elicit
favorable cognitive responses that are rehearsed and stored in long term memory.”
The goal of both VALs and AIOs was to research consumers to find out what their
existing beliefs and attitudes were so that new messages could be targeted to people who
already held positions consistent with the aim of the new message.  The better the creator
of a persuasive message understood the recipient, the better the chance that the creator
could receive support for the persuasive message.  This was a key point in the 2016
presidential elections.
Hillary Clinton became a public figure in American politics in 1992 when husband
Bill won the presidential election.  By 2016, people had 24 years to form an opinion of
Hillary Clinton.  According to a Gallup Poll, 51% of Americans had a negative view of her in
July 2016 (McCarthy, 2016).  The public perception of those with negative opinions of
Clinton was that she could not be trusted, was unethical, and dishonest.
From a psychographic perspective, Clinton’s negatives provided a rich field for
exploitation.  These included:
(i) Since Clinton had a public personate for 24 years, many people held a fixed view of
her that the campaigns would have a difficult time changing.  Professional women
over 60 identified with Clinton’s trials and tribulations because their life conflicts
were like Clinton’s.  Her successes reinforced their self-esteem.  However, the people
with the negative views were not going to change their opinions of her easily,
particularly those people who saw her as a threat to their ideological positions.
People with negative views of affirmative action, gay rights, immigration, and Muslims
saw Clinton as supporting the efforts of these groups to join the American mainstream.
Many saw her as the enemy of true Christians, anti-patriotic, and an opponent of the
U.S. military and veterans.
(ii) Advertising dollars and debates were not going to change those opinions of either the
supporters or haters through the central route.  The viewpoints had previous knowledge
supporting ideological positions closely tied to strong, personal identification.
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(iii) Trump could appeal to the negative views of Clinton with the “lock her up” campaign
slogan.  The Russian social media accounts could easily create advertisements and
advertisements that appealed to people who already hated Clinton personally or
ideologically.
(iv) Ideologically, social media already had platforms in place for those with strongly
held ideological positions opposing Clinton.
The Social Media
As Singh and Shukla (2016)  point out, the media is more pervasive than ever.  “Media have
increasingly embedded itself so deeply into the web of the human interactions and
perceptions in the modern world, thus constantly contributing and reshaping the
understanding and perceptions of individuals in a community, towards the community
and about the characteristics that make and transform the community,” they write (p. 277).
This stands in contrast to past elections when negative television advertisements would
have been purchased in select television markets to turn Clinton negatives into Trump
voters.  Some of those happened in 2016.  The big change, however, was the advertising
opportunities offered by Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and other social media
outlets.  As Mark Zuckerberg told Congress (The Switch, 2018), “We think offering an ad-
supported service is the most aligned with our mission of trying to help connect everyone
in the world because we want to offer a free service that everyone can afford.”  As Facebook
Business page states (2019), “Stay up-to-date on the latest features and get strategic advice
to help make your ads more effective.”  Facebook experts and a series of Facebook tutorials
on how to maximize advertising dollars would have been available to the IRA or other
Russian groups purchasing ads.  Twitter offers similar help for those buying ads (2019).
YouTube (2019) offers a quality advertising experience: “You don’t need to get your ad in
front of everybody – just the people likely to be interested in what you have to offer. Sports
fans around the block. Fashionistas around the world. And everyone in between. They’re
all on YouTube.”
The Russians wanted to hinder Clinton’s run for president.  The electorate that
wanted to vote against her was already in place.  The social media experts found those
negative votes collected together in various meaning communities formed around shared
ideology, similar need fulfilment, and high levels of knowledge and ego involvement.  The
social media experts delivered those communities to the Russians so that the Russians
could tailor messages to reach groups with the message most likely to trigger their dislike
of Clinton.
The Russian Fakes
The Russians took psychographics into new dimensions by running social media
advertisements and spreading fake news stories.1  They claimed Clinton had health
problems, was supported by a world financial conspiracy, and they released her emails
(Timberg, 24 November 2016).  Then there was the Facebook post that claimed that Clinton
was part of a paedophile ring run out of a pizza parlor in Washington, D.C. (Robb, 2017).
Goodman & Goodman
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The “story” made it to the pages of Info-Wars run by Alex Jones, which is hosted by the
“independent journalism” of www.independent.co.uk.   The Russian foreign intelligence service
started the rumor that Seth Rich was murdered on orders of Hillary Clinton (Iskikoff, 2019).
Advertisements run by the Russians ramped up the ideology. The first example we
use shows Satan (red with horns) armwresting with a Jesus figure (Caucasin, eyes locked,
dressed in a robe).  The background behind Satan shows the fires of hell while the background
behind Jesus shows a waterfall in a sun-lit valley.  Over the shoulder of Jesus is an icon for
Army of Jesus.  The language with the ad states: “Today Americans can elect a president
with godly moral principles.  Hillary is a Satan, and her crimes and lies had proven just
how evil she is. And even though Donald Trump isn’t a saint by any means, he’s at least an
honest man, and he cares deeply for this country.  My vote goes for him!”2
The U.S. House Intelligence Committee released many of the Russian ads, including
Satan vs. Jesus  (House Intelligence Committee, 2018; see other ads at Moneywatch, 2018;
Hatmaker, 2018; Politico, 2018).  This ad was sponsored on Facebook by a Facebook
organization, Army of Jesus, which identifies itself as located in Shanghai, China (Army of
Jesus, 2018); its slogan is “Die Daily for Jesus Christ.”  The ad generated 97 reactions, 15
comments, and 29 shares.   Farber and Schallhorn (2018) reported that the ad costs $1.10
and ran Oct. 19-20, 2016.
By deconstructing the ad, the psychographic elements are revealed.  From a Maslow
hierarchy of needs perspective, the ad appeals to safety and security (Satan vs Jesus) and
belonging through appeals to joining Jesus/Christianity against the threats to safety, Satan/
Clinton.  The ad also allows Jesus supporters to ideologically join the Army-of-Jesus.
According to Chan and Ma (2017), “This ad targeted people who liked Facebook pages linked
to religion, Republican politicians, and conservative politicians, such as ‘God,’ ‘Christianity,’
‘Bible,’ ‘Jesus,’ ‘Ron Paul,’ and ‘Rush Limbaugh.’”  In 2016 Trump sought Christian voters by
promising to appoint a pro-life justice to the U.S. Supreme Court (Sullivan, 2016).  In the
election white evangelicals supported Trump 77% to 16% (Pew Research Center, 2018).
For an about one dollar, the ad reached 100 potential voters on Facebook, who had
already stated a preference on Facebook for conservative politics, against Clinton, for Trump,
and/or strongly Christian.  From a psychographic perspective, the ad was cheap, and it reached
the intended audience with a strong emotional appeal to their values.
A second ad we analyzed is labeled on Facebook as “Back the Badge.”3 This ad run
by IRA was seen by more than 1.3 million people on Facebook (Ng, 2018).  “The ad, which
was posted on Oct. 19, 2016 — 20 days before the US presidential election — received
1,334,544 views and 73,063 clicks,” wrote Ng.  The ad costs about $1700.  Back the Badge
was presented on Facebook as an authentic group of people who supported police officers.
Ackerman (2018) believes the ad was so successful because of the support on Facebook for
the Blue Lives Matter movement.
The ad appeals to safety needs; the red lights of the police car indicates there is a
danger.  It appeals to belonging, particularly for those identified on Facebook with Blue
Lives Matter.  The police shield is a widely recognized cultural artefact.  The shield appears
to be blackened by gunpowder or maybe smoke.  The source of the threat is not clear,
making it easy for each person who saw the ad to assigned their sense of danger to the
context through which they read the ad.
In terms of psychographics, the ad appeals to those who view police as the “brave”
people who protect their lives and property from those who would do them harm.
By implication, the supporters are not criminals, but people who have enough wealth to
need protection.  They also people who feel like they cannot protect themselves from the
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evil in society.  By liking the ad, the people show the support for police without having to
make any commitment for higher pay, more officers, or other expenses required to put the
police cars on the street.
Matheny and Goodman (2018) note in an analysis of Trump’s Republican
Convention nomination acceptance speech that Trump put a heavy emphasis on good vs
evil.  Trump linked his campaign with stability and assigned attributes of chaos to the
Clinton campaign, they point out in their analysis.  Trump’s calls for stability were greeted
with “USA, USA, USA” by the convention audience; his identification of Clinton with evil led
to chants of “lock her up” (p. 15).
The ideology of the ad fit with themes of the Trump campaign.  As the person for
stability, Trump-aligned with Back the Badge.  Conversely, the Back the Badge people would
find Clinton as the source of chaos and a threat to safety if they accepted Trump’s view of
Clinton.  The IRA appealed to these divisions with the ad and connected into the ideology of
the pre-existing Blue Lives Matter meaning community.
The Russians in placing the ads were after more than just votes.  The subtle ways
that Facebook posts were used is a compelling argument that content reached people and
subtly pushed them farther away from the political center without the reader knowing they
were being manipulated.
Impact
According to Jamieson (2018), 126,000,000 people were exposed to Russian efforts on
Facebook and with even more reached through other social media (p. 10-11).  Jamieson
concludes that these social media efforts mobilized people likely to vote for Trump and
discouraged people likely to vote for Hillary Clinton by making her look bad.  The social
media efforts “tilted the balance of discourse in battleground states against the Democratic
party nominee,” she writes (p. 7).
Psychographics reinforce existing ideological positions and affirm existing
opinions, and content creators can take advantage of this to push people farther away
from the political center and create more divisiveness among readers, particularly those
opinions held in the central route by the individual.  People in the peripheral route may be
persuaded to evaluate an issue that has been unimportant to them in the past.  In 2016,
with opinions so strong for Trump and Clinton before the election, and with the negative
views of both candidates high, the percentage of undecided voters by November was down
to 5% (Chalabi, 2016).  The unknown on election day November 8 was who was going to
turn out to vote.
By comparing election totals, it is clear that Trump outperformed recent Republican
candidates for president.  Trump collected about 63 million votes (46.1%) to Clinton’s 65.5
million (48.2%).  However, Trump collected 304 electoral votes to 227 for Clinton.  In
comparison, Democrat Barrack Obama received about 66 million votes in 2012, and the
Republican Mitt Romney got about 61 million.  Comparing votes by Congressional district
between 2012 and 2016, Trump improved over Romney significantly in the upper Midwest
(Skelley, 2017).  According to Wikipedia results for 2012 and 2016, here are results from
key Midwestern states. We note the key changes in the election totals.
Goodman & Goodman
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State Obama 2012 Clinton 2016 Romney 2012 Trump 2016
Michigan 1,546,167 (52.65%) 2,268,839 (47.24%) 1,320,224 (44.96%) 2,279,543 (47.5)%
16 electorals +959,319
Wisconsin 1,620,985 (52.83%) 1,382,536 (46.45%) 1,407.966 (45.89%) 1,405,284 (47.22%)
10 electorals -238,449
Flor ida 4,237,756 (50.01%) 4,504,975 (47.82%) 4,163,447 (49.13%) 4,617,886 (49.02%)
29 electorals +454,439
Pennsylvania 2,990,274 (51.97%) 2,926,441 (47.46%) 2,680,434 (46.59%) 2,970,733 (48.18%)
20 electorals -60,833 +290,299
Totals 65,915,795 65,853,514 60,933,504 62,984,828
-62,281 +2,051,324
The number of eligible people voting in 2012 was 57.5% compared to 58% in 2016.
In those four years the number of eligible voters increased.  For some reason, there were
more than 2 million more Republican voters in 2016 than in 2012, and about 60,000 fewer
people voted Democrat.  In 2012, 7,220,399,  people voted for a third-party candidate; in
2016 the number was 7,832,634.  Most importantly, voters in Michigan, Wisconsin, Florida,
and Pennsylvania swung their 75 electoral votes from Obama to the Republican Donald
Trump, which was all but 2 of the margin of Trump’s win (77) in the electoral college.
Ballotpedia (2016) reports changes of voting patterns in only 206 counties across the U.S.
To quote its website, “President Donald Trump (R) won 2,626 counties nationwide,
while Hillary Clinton (D) won 487 counties. Of the 2,626 counties Trump won, Ballotpedia
identified 206 counties that voted for Trump in 2016 after voting for Barack Obama (D) in
2008 and 2012. Collectively, Trump won these Pivot Counties by more than 580,000 votes,
and had an average margin of victory of 11.45 per cent.”
Pew Research Center identified several psychographic factors that influenced
voting behavior in the presidential election.  Trump received at least 60% of the vote from
white Catholics, born again Christians, and Mormons, according to exit polls (Martinez
and Smith, 2016).  Those who never attended religious services voted for Clinton by 62%.
Tyson and Maniam (2016) reported that whites voted for Trump by 58% and men by 53%;
those without college degrees 52%; voters over 65 by 53%.  Clinton won black voters (88%),
women (54%), college graduates (52%), and voters 18-29 (53%).  Krogstad and Lopez (2016)
indicate that Clinton got 71% of the Latino vote.
A single factor rarely, if ever, explains why a person votes for a candidate.  However,
the 2016 U.S. presidential election shows the potential impact for psychographic targeting
of voters.  Something motivated more than two million people to vote Republican in 2016
than in 2012 while the total number of Democratic voters declined.  The electorate divided
along the lines of gender, age, race, and education, which were factors used by the Russians
in targeting social media groups with their advertising.  A logical conclusion is that the
Russian efforts may have convinced more Republicans to go vote than ever before or
persuaded Obama voters to not vote for Clinton.  The new voters likely found ideological
agreement with Trump and perhaps held even pre-existing poor opinions of Hillary Clinton,
points reinforced in the Russian campaign.
None of the Russian social media advertisements or posts had to be true.  The
costs were low per voter contact.  The ads highlighted ideological agreement and ignored
truth.  They reached people who had already decided where they stood on issues and
candidates.  The only question was if those angry people would turn out to vote for Donald
Trump.  The statistics suggest that two million of those voters did.
15
Implications for Democracy
The truth is important for a democracy.  The first premise of democratic government is that
the collective wisdom of the voters will lead to intelligent decisions.  How does a populace
achieve collective wisdom when the truth is being buried by those trying to manipulate the
system for their benefits?  The second premise of democracy is called the marketplace of
ideas, which is expressed in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions written by Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis.  The justices argued that censorship was antithetical
to democracy because the only way to find the truth was to hear all ideas.  Through this
marketplace of ideas and public debate, the best ideas would emerge, and the collective
wisdom could be asserted.  However, the justices wrote their decisions before 1940 when
network radio stations, newspapers and print were the major sources of public information.
In an internet and social media world, those people whose opinions are rejected form a
private group on Facebook or podcasts their opinions.  An idea accepted by 1 in a million
people can have 1000 followers on the internet.  Then those 1000 people can attack the
truth-tellers.
For example, years after 26 people were killed at Sandy Hook Elementary School,
parents of the dead and injured children sued Alex Jones for defamation after Jones claimed
the shooting was fabricated (Romo, 2018).  For example, video of House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi was edited to make her appear drunk or her speech disjointed; those videos were
tweeted by President Donald Trump and his lawyer Rudy Giuliani (Harwell, 24 May 2019).
Technology makes changes to actual video footage easy to manipulate and to create footage
that is difficult to differentiate from the changed video (Harwell, 12 June 2019).  For example,
the Chinese government pays 448 million people to write posts to web sites and social
media (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2017).  For example, a claim was posted on WhatsApp that
“Madrid Mayor Manuela Carmena planned to set up open “sex zones” for gay people
around the city” (Stolton, 2019).  Among the web sites that specialize in alternative views
of the news are dai lycaller.com, dai lymail.co.uk, breitbart.com;
thelastamericanvagabond.com lists 33 sites for alternative perspectives on the news.
Correcting the record is difficult, argue Sellnow, Parrish, and Semenas (2019).  “Even after
providing evidence refuting the hoax claims, lingering concerns from some of the afflicted
organization’s publics can linger,” they explain (p. 125).
The Russians put psychographics on steroids by putting the human and financial
resources into their social media efforts to spread a world view consistent with Russian
propaganda goals.  Fake news, conspiracy theories, Facebook posts, Twitter feeds, and
YouTube videos make it easy and cheap for any actors, from the Russians to a single laptop
user, to spread information that can disrupt an election.  People have picked up their guns
and organized mobs to stop evil as it has been identified by someone, somewhere, for
whatever reason.  While the false stories are cheap to produce, professionals have to
develop sophisticated strategies to counter the false information; the truth is expensive to
publish when the facts are at war with fake news.  We live in a media climate where
propaganda can stand toe-to-toe with the truth, and few people can sort out the facts.
Notes
1As Kohle (2014) points out, the mass audience gave enormous power to the small group of people—
”politicians, news agencies, broadcasters, and editors-in-chief”—who controlled the flow of information
to the public (p. 175). Without the gatekeepers of the establishment establishing standards, fake news
could proliferate unchallenged.
2See ad at https://nationalpost.com/news/world/hillary-is-a-satan-ten-ads-that-russian-trolls-posted-
during-the-2016-u-s-election
3See ad at https://www.thedailybeast.com/russians-biggest-facebook-ad-promoted-blue-lives-matter
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